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Abstract Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is charac-
terised by profound difficulties in empathic processing and
executive control. Whilst the links between these processes
have been frequently investigated in populations with
autism, few studies have examined them at the subclinical
level. In addition, the contribution of alexithymia, a trait
characterised by impaired interoceptive awareness and
empathy, and elevated in those with ASD, is currently
unclear. The present two-part study employed a compre-
hensive battery of tasks to examine these processes. Find-
ings support the notion that executive function and theory
of mind are related abilities. They also suggest that indi-
viduals with elevated levels of autism-like traits experience
a partially similar pattern of social and executive function
difficulties to those diagnosed with ASD, and that these
impairments are not explained by co-occurring
alexithymia.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder  Subclinical
autism traits  Theory of mind  Executive control 
Alexithymia
Introduction
Empathy is the ability to understand and share the affective
experiences of others (Decety and Jackson 2006; Decety
and Lamm 2006; Singer and Lamm 2009) and plays a
pivotal role in the formation of successful human rela-
tionships (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Decety
2010; Dziobek et al. 2008; Rameson et al. 2012; Singer
2006). Two main components contribute to empathic pro-
cessing: an affective component, which allows one to
vicariously experience the feelings of others whilst
understanding that they are distinct from one’s own, and a
cognitive component (also referred to as metalizing, cog-
nitive perspective-taking, or Theory of Mind; ToM), which
involves the ability to understand and make inferences
about what another person is thinking or feeling, without
necessarily sharing that mental state (Frith and Frith 2003;
Jones et al. 2010; Premack and Woodruff 1978; Schwenck
et al. 2012; Shamay-Tsoory 2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al.
2009).
Empathy and Autism Spectrum Disorder
Deficits in empathic functioning have frequently been cited
as a core feature of autism spectrum disorder (ASD)—a
lifelong neurodevelopmental condition marked by pro-
found impairments in social interaction and communica-
tion, as well as repetitive behaviors and restricted interests
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). Over the past
few decades, a growing body of research has revealed
ASD-related impairments in ToM. For instance, Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) documented lower levels
of empathy for adults with ASDs using the empathy quo-
tient (EQ), a 40-item self-report questionnaire that pri-
marily focuses on the cognitive domain of empathy.
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Behavioral data from studies using static (e.g., Baron-Co-
hen et al. 1997, 2001a, c; Dziobek et al. 2006; Lahera et al.
2014), and more naturalistic video-based assessments of
ToM (e.g., Dziobek et al. 2006; Heavey et al. 2000; Lahera
et al. 2014; Ponnet et al. 2008) have also reported ASD-
specific deficits in mental state attribution.
Conversely, results from studies examining affective
empathy in ASD have been far less consistent. For
instance, Minio-Paluello and colleagues (Minio-Paluello
et al. 2009) found that individuals with ASD showed no
sensorimotor resonance when observing another person in
pain. Findings from related investigations in ASD samples,
however, indicate typical physiological responses to oth-
ers’ pain (Fan et al. 2014; Hadjikhani et al. 2014) and
distress (Blair 1999). In fact, Smith (2009) suggests that
autism is associated with heightened levels of affective
empathy, and reports of greater responsiveness to others’
emotional states in children with ASD yield support for this
hypothesis (Capps et al. 1993).
To date, only a small number of studies have jointly
assessed the cognitive and affective components of
empathy in ASD populations. For instance, using the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1980), Rogers and
colleagues (Rogers et al. 2007) reported reduced cognitive
empathy in adults with Asperger syndrome, but found no
impairments in empathic concern (a process related to
affective empathy). A later study by Dziobek et al. (2008)
also revealed dissociable deficits in empathic processing.
These researchers found that whilst there were no group
differences in the affective domain of the Multifaceted
Empathy Test, individuals with ASD exhibited clear
deficits in their ability to infer another person’s mental
state. Studies investigating empathic processing in chil-
dren with ASD also revealed cognitive empathy deficits.
Findings from these studies suggest that while boys with
ASD experience significant difficulties in mentalization,
their capacity to resonate with another person’s emotional
state remains intact (Jones et al. 2010; Schwenck et al.
2012). Taken together, these studies indicate that indi-
viduals with ASD show specific difficulties in mental
state attribution, rather than a global deficit in empathic
processing.
Recent examinations of ASD traits in the general pop-
ulation yield a similar pattern of results. For example,
Go¨kc¸en et al. (2014) reported poorer ToM performance in
typically developing adults with elevated levels of ASD
traits. In a study investigating both domains of empathic
functioning, higher ASD traits were associated with atyp-
ical perspective-taking abilities on the animated triangles
task, but no impairments were found on a measure exam-
ining affective responses to emotional faces (Lockwood
et al. 2013). In sum, these findings suggest that even in the
absence of a clinical diagnosis, individuals with higher
levels of autistic-like traits may be more susceptible than
the general population to ASD-related empathy deficits.
Alexithymia
An important consideration when examining empathy
processes in ASD is the high comorbidity between autism
and alexithymia. Alexithymia is a subclinical condition
characterized by difficulties in the ability to recognize,
express, and distinguish emotional states from bodily sen-
sations (Nemiah et al. 1976). In recent years, studies have
suggested that the affective and empathic deficits associ-
ated with autism may be a consequence of co-occurring
alexithymia, rather than ASD per se (Bird et al. 2010; Cook
et al. 2013; Silani et al. 2008), and that controlling for
alexithymia reveals comparable levels of empathy in
individuals with and without ASD (Bird and Cook 2013).
Nevertheless, reports from studies examining autistic
individuals (Fan et al. 2014) and ASD traits in typically
developing populations (Lockwood et al. 2013) showed no
significant effects of alexithymia on measures of empathic
processing.
Executive Function
A further consideration in the study of empathy is its
relationship with executive function, which refers to a set
of higher-order cognitive mechanisms facilitating adaptive
and goal-directed behavior in a constantly changing envi-
ronment (Corbett et al. 2009; Jurado and Rosselli 2007;
Lezak 1995). Executive functions are thought to encom-
pass several distinct, yet interrelated processes, such as
planning, cognitive flexibility (or set-shifting), and
response inhibition (Stuss and Knight 2002). To date, there
has been a wealth of evidence suggesting a robust link
between these higher-order processes and mentalizing
ability. For instance, studies examining this association in
typically developing children have found that better abili-
ties in executive control were related to enhanced perfor-
mance on ToM tasks, independent of intellectual
functioning (Austin et al. 2014; Carlson et al. 2013; Carl-
son and Moses 2001; Carlson et al. 2002; Hughes 1998a, b;
Sabbagh et al. 2006; though see also Pellicano 2007; Perner
et al. 2002). Furthermore, growing empirical evidence
suggests that the positive association between executive
and ToM processes extends beyond childhood into ado-
lescence and adulthood (Apperly et al. 2010; Bull et al.
2008; Dumontheil et al. 2010; Go¨kc¸en et al. 2014; Vetter
et al. 2013).
Considerable attention has also been devoted to under-
standing the executive function and ToM link in autistic
populations. Studies have shown that along with impaired
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mentalisation, individuals with autism (Dawson et al. 1998;
McEvoy et al. 1993; Pellicano 2007; Robinson et al. 2009;
for reviews see Hill 2004a, b; and Russo et al. 2007), or
with elevated levels of ASD traits (Christ et al. 2010;
Go¨kc¸en et al. 2014), exhibit significant deficits in multiple
domains of executive processing. In addition, results from
studies assessing both executive and ToM abilities in ASD
have consistently revealed a link between the two con-
structs, independent of intellectual capacity (Joseph and
Tager-Flusberg 2004; Ozonoff et al. 1991; Pellicano 2007).
Similar results have also been obtained from a sample of
neurotypical adults demonstrating higher and lower levels
of ASD traits (Go¨kc¸en et al. 2014). Findings showed that
adults in the high trait group displayed significantly poorer
performance on tasks tapping ToM and cognitive flexibil-
ity, relative to their low trait counterparts. However, it is
worth noting that other investigations have documented
non-significant correlations between measures of ToM and
executive functioning in individuals with ASD (Dziobek
et al. 2006; Lahera et al. 2014).
Given the observed association and the coexistence of
executive function and ToM deficits in autism, numerous
studies have sought to establish the interrelationships
between these cognitive domains in typical and atypical
development. Whilst some researchers (Perner 1998, 2000;
Perner and Lang 2000) contend that intact ToM fosters
executive function, stronger support has emerged for the
opposing view (Russell 1997, 2002), viz., that intact
executive functioning is a prerequisite for ToM develop-
ment in individuals with (Pellicano 2007) and without
(Austin et al. 2014; Hughes 1998b; Hughes and Ensor
2007) ASD. Together, these findings highlight the impor-
tance of executive function skills in successful mentaliza-
tion, and suggest that ToM impairments observed in ASD
may be a reflection of deficiencies in executive control.
While the executive function and ToM link has been
well-documented throughout the literature, less is known
about its possible relationship with the affective domain of
empathy. Some reports suggest a significant association
between affective empathy and executive control processes
in patients with frontotemporal dementia (Eslinger et al.
2011). However, there is a dearth of research examining
this association in relation to ASD and typical
development.
To summarise, in light of the emerging evidence sug-
gesting a qualitatively similar (though milder) pattern of
impairments among those with elevated levels of ASD
traits, assessing autism symptomatology among typically
developing populations is a promising way forward,
potentially offering novel information about the social and
non-social features of ASDs. A key advantage of examin-
ing typically developing individuals with ASD traits is that
they are more likely to be tolerant of structured testing
environments than those with a clinical diagnosis. Thus, we
may be able to gain unique insights into the spectrum by
employing a wider range of tasks and methodologies when
studying this broader population.
Furthermore, establishing links between empathic
functioning and executive control in ASD could have
important implications for both clinical and non-clinical
ASD. Specifically, a comprehensive examination of these
processes could help identify key neurocognitive mecha-
nisms that may influence the therapeutic efficacy of social
interventions. Interventions within the interpersonal sphere
typically focus on broader, more goal-oriented aspects of
social interactions (improving general conversational
skills, forming interpersonal relationships etc.) and their
application to real-world settings. However, given the
meaningful overlap between social and non-social domains
of cognition, it may be necessary to remediate the deficits
in more ‘basic’ neurocognitive processes, before targeting
more higher-order social competencies. A multi-tier inter-
vention strategy could, therefore, enhance positive out-
comes and prove more effective in alleviating the negative
consequences associated with social dysfunction in autism
(e.g., peer-rejection, loneliness, and mental health diffi-
culties; Bauminger and Kasari 2000; Chamberlain et al.
2007; Tantam 2003). Furthermore, given that the autism
spectrum extends into the general population, typically
developing individuals with elevated levels of ASD traits
may also benefit from programmes supporting adaptive
social functioning. However, a necessary prerequisite for
devising such interventions is furthering our understanding
of the neurocognitive processes associated with social
dysfunction in ASD.
The Present Study
The present two-study paper aimed to provide a compre-
hensive examination of the empathy, executive function,
and ASD trait link in a sample of typically developing
adults and adolescents. In study 1, we investigated multiple
domains of empathic processing by utilising ecologically
valid measures of cognitive (Movie for the Assessment of
Social Cognition, MASC; Dziobek et al. 2006) and affec-
tive (Self-Assessment Manikin Faces Task, SAM; Seara-
Cardoso et al. 2012) empathy. Our second study examined
the association between empathic processing, ASD traits,
and the executive domains of response inhibition, planning,
and cognitive flexibility. Across both studies, we sought to
determine the potential contribution of alexithymia to
performance on measures of cognitive and affective
empathy as well as to examine its association with multiple
aspects of executive control.
Based on the evidence outlined above, we predicted that
individuals with higher ASD traits would demonstrate
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poorer performance on measures of cognitive, but not
affective, empathy (H1), and this impairment was expected
to be more pronounced on the naturalistic MASC task
relative to a static measure of cognitive empathy (i.e.,
Reading the Mind from the Eyes Test, EYES; Baron-Co-
hen et al. 2001a; H2). In addition to a unique contribution
by subclinical autism traits, we expected a positive rela-
tionship between measures of executive control and the
cognitive, but not the affective, domain of empathic pro-
cessing (H3). We further hypothesised that individuals with
higher levels of ASD traits would demonstrate poorer
performance on tasks assessing executive control (H4).
With respect to alexithymia, higher levels of this trait
have been shown to predict deficits in both cognitive
(Moriguchi et al. 2006) and affective (Lockwood et al.
2013) empathy, along with impaired executive functioning
(Koven and Thomas 2010). Consequently, we predicted
that elevated levels of alexithymia would be related to
poorer performance on measures of cognitive and affective
empathy (H5) as well as on measures of executive control
(H6). Consistent with the existing developmental literature
reporting a protracted development of empathic and
executive processes over the period of preadolescence and
adulthood (Decety 2010; Dumontheil et al. 2010), we
expected older participants to evidence better task perfor-
mance on measures of cognitive empathy and executive
control. In contrast, we did not expect to find a predictive
relationship between age and the affective domain of
empathy. Similarly, given that general cognitive ability has
been associated with ToM performance and executive
control abilities (Pellicano 2007), we incorporated IQ into
our design as a control variable to examine whether ASD
traits and executive function contribute unique variance to
empathic processing over and above general cognitive
ability.
Study 1
Method
Participants
One-hundred-and-twenty-four healthy adults and adoles-
cents were recruited through a university subject pool and a
London-based Sixth-Form college. Two participants were
excluded from the analyses because they were missing data
on one of the experimental tasks, and one because he or she
scored above the clinical cut-off point (i.e., 32?) on the
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al.
2001c). This left a final sample of 121 participants (15 %
male) aged 16-35 (M = 18.43, SD = 1.93), with IQs
ranging between 72 and 129 (M = 102.02, SD = 11.55).
Measures
ASD Traits The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001b) is a
50-item self-report questionnaire based on a 4-point Likert
scale designed to assess autism traits in both clinical and
community samples. Responses in the ‘autistic’ direction
receive 1-point, whilst ‘non-autistic’ responses receive 0
points. Total scores range from 0 to 50, with higher scores
indicating greater levels of autism symptomatology. Psy-
chometric examination of the AQ has revealed good test–
retest reliability and moderate-to-high internal consistency
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001c; Cronbach’s alpha was 0.67 in
the present study), as well as good discriminative validity
(Woodbury-Smith et al. 2005).
Alexithymic Traits Alexithymic traits were assessed using
the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS; Bagby et al. 1994), a
20-item instrument comprising three dimensions: difficulty
identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and
externally oriented thinking. Each item is responded to on a
five-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to
‘‘strongly agree’’. Total scores vary from 20 to 100, with
higher scores indicating a greater degree of alexithymia.
The TAS has generally shown robust psychometric prop-
erties (Bagby et al. 2007; Parker et al. 2003; Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.81 in the present study).
Assessment of Empathic Functioning
Cognitive Empathy
Static Theory of Mind The Reading the Mind from the Eyes
Test (EYES; Baron-Cohen 2001a) is a widely used mea-
sure of theory of mind ability. It assesses the capacity to
understand and infer the mental state of others from static
images depicting the eye region of the face. Based on this
visual information alone, respondents are required to
choose which of four mental state terms (one target word
and three foils) correctly depicts what the person in the
picture is thinking or feeling. Two variants of this test were
administered: the revised 36-item adult version (Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001a; completed by all participants recruited
via the subject pool) and the 28-item child version (com-
pleted by all participants recruited via a Sixth-Form
college).
The adult EYES comprises complex mental state terms
(e.g., ‘pensive’, ‘playful’, and ‘elated’), whilst the child
version consists of simpler descriptors (e.g., ‘happy’,
‘sad’, and ‘scared’). Participants completing the adult
version were informed that they could request an expla-
nation of the descriptor meanings and could also consult a
glossary, if they were unsure of any of the words used.
J Autism Dev Disord (2016) 46:2072–2087 2075
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One point was assigned for all correct answers and a
percentage of accuracy score was calculated for each
participant.
Naturalistic Theory of Mind The Movie for the
Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al.
2006) is a naturalistic video-based mentalizing task that
approximates the demands of real-life social situations. It
involves watching a 15-min movie about four characters
spending an evening together and answering questions
concerning their mental states. The film incorporates
themes about peer and romantic relationships, and requires
participants to process information from visual (e.g., facial
expressions and eye gaze), auditory (e.g., prosody), and
verbal (e.g., content of language) channels. The film is
paused at 45 points, and participants are asked to respond
to questions relating to the characters’ thoughts, feelings,
and intentions (e.g., ‘‘What is Cliff feeling?,’’ ‘‘What is
Betty thinking?,’’ ‘‘Why is Michael doing this?’’). Answer
options are presented in a multi-choice format comprising
four response options: (1) hypermentalizing (e.g., ‘‘she is
exasperated about Michael coming on too strong’’), (2)
under/reduced mentalizing (e.g., ‘‘she is pleased about his
compliment’’), (3) no mentalizing (e.g., ‘‘her hair does not
look that nice’’), and (4) accurate mentalizing (e.g., ‘‘she is
flattered but somewhat taken by surprise’’). Accurate
responses receive one point, and total scores vary between
0 and 45, with higher values indicating greater mentalizing
ability. Adequate psychometric properties have been
reported for the MASC (Dziobek et al. 2006; Lahera et al.
2014), with the task successfully distinguishing between
healthy participants and individuals diagnosed with
Asperger syndrome (Dziobek et al. 2006; Lahera et al.
2014), Schizophrenia (Montag et al. 2011), and borderline
personality disorder (Preißler et al. 2010).
Affective Empathy
The Self-Assessment Manikin Faces Task (SAM) is an
ecologically valid index of affective empathy (Lockwood
et al. 2013; Seara-Cardoso et al. 2012). It requires partic-
ipants to rate their own emotional response to pictures of
faces displaying sad, fearful, angry, happy, or neutral
expressions. Participants respond to each image using a
9-point valence scale, ranging from a low-spirited manikin
(‘1’) to a cheerful one (‘9’), with a neutral manikin in the
middle (‘5’). The sequence of images was randomized for
each participant and the ratings for sadness, fear, and anger
were reverse-scored so that higher scores reflected greater
distress when viewing others’ negative emotions. These
variables were subsequently transformed into z-scores and
a composite score was created along with the ratings for
happy expressions.
General Cognitive Ability
The full-scale IQ of each participant was measured using
the two-subset form (Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning) of
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler 1999).
Procedure
The study protocol was granted ethical approval from the
university Research Ethics Committee, and written
informed consent was obtained from all participants and
from parents of adolescents. A series of tasks assessing
social cognitive functioning were administered as part of a
wider battery of measures. Each participant was tested
individually for approximately two hours in a quiet, dimly
lit, room. All tasks were presented in randomised order and
instructions were provided at the beginning of each test.
Participants were allowed to take short rest breaks between
the tasks as needed. At the end of the test battery, an
estimate of general intellectual functioning was obtained
using the two-subtest form of the Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler 1999).
Results
The means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation
coefficients for all variables can be seen in Table 1. As
hypothesized, ASD traits showed a significant negative
correlation with MASC (r = -.404, p\ .001) and EYES
(r = -.218, p = .017) performance, but not with SAM
scores (r = .023, p = .804). Alexithymia was negatively
associated with MASC (r = -.402, p\ .001) and EYES
performance (r = -.303, p = .001), and positively asso-
ciated with ASD traits (r = .437, p\ .001). The negative
association between TAS scores and SAM performance did
not reach statistical significance (r = -.106, p = .249).
Finally, whilst performance on the MASC and EYES tasks
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures of
autism spectrum disorder, alexithymic traits, and task performance
M SD 1 2 3 4
1. AQ 15.50 5.18
2. TAS 46.83 10.04 .437**
3. MASC 34.74 4.45 -.404** -.402**
4. EYES 79.34 10.10 -.218* -.303** .288**
5. SAM .001 1.73 .023 -.106 -.036 .158
AQ Autism Spectrum Quotient, TAS Toronto Alexithymia Scale,
MASC Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition, EYES Reading
the Mind from the Eyes Test, SAM Self-Assessment Manikin Faces
Task
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01
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was positively correlated (r = .288, p = .001), neither of
these ToM measures were significantly correlated with
SAM performance (MASC: r = -.036, p = .692; EYES:
r = .158, p = .083).
Hierarchical Regressions
We conducted hierarchical multiple regression in order to
investigate the association between ASD traits and ToM
performance, whilst controlling for alexithymia, age, and
general cognitive ability. Beta estimates for the models are
presented in Table 2. This analysis was intended to further
assess the hypothesis that higher ASD traits would be
related to greater difficulties in cognitive empathy (H1) and
that and this impairment would be more pronounced on the
MASC task relative to the EYES test (H2). For the model
predicting naturalistic ToM performance, total MASC
scores were first regressed onto Age and IQ scores. The
regression model was significant (R = .43, R2 adj = .17,
F(2,118) = 12.99, p\ .001), with the two predictors col-
lectively explaining 18 % of the variance in MASC scores.
Age (t(118) = 2.28, p = .024) and IQ (t(118) = 2.92,
p = .004) were both positive predictors of MASC perfor-
mance. At the second step alexithymia scores were entered.
The regression model remained significant (R = .49, R2
adj = .22, F(3,117) = 12.40, p\ .001), with the three pre-
dictors jointly explaining 24 % of the variance in natural-
istic ToM performance. Trait alexithymia (t(117) = 3.06,
p = .003) and IQ (t(117) = 2.34, p = .021) were both
uniquely associated with MASC performance, but Age
(t(117) = 1.48, p = .142) was no longer a significant
predictor. The signs of the coefficients suggested that ele-
vated levels of alexithymia and lower IQ scores were
related to poorer MASC performance. The R2 change was
significant (F(1,117) change = 9.37, p = .003), indicating
that including trait alexithymia explained significant addi-
tional variance in the model.
At the third and final step, ASD traits were entered.
Once again, the regression model was significant (R = .56,
R2 adj = .29, F(4,116) = 13.31, p\ .001), with the four
predictors collectively explaining 32 % of the variance in
MASC scores. Of the four predictors, only ASD traits
(t(116) = 3.52, p = .001) and IQ (t(116) = 2.75, p = .007)
were uniquely associated with naturalistic ToM perfor-
mance. The signs of the coefficients indicated that elevated
levels of ASD traits and lower IQ scores were related to
difficulties in mental state attribution. The R2 change was
significant (F(1,116) change = 12.42, p = .001), suggesting
that the inclusion of ASD traits explained significant
additional variance in the model. Neither alexithymia
(t(116) = 1.44, p = .152), nor Age (t(116) = 1.42, p = .159)
reached significance levels as predictors in the final model.
To examine hypothesis H2, and to further test H1, the
same regression sequence was applied to static ToM per-
formance. At the first step, scores on the EYES test were
regressed onto Age and IQ. The regression model was
significant (R = .25, R2 adj = .05, F(2,118) = 4.08,
p = .019), with the two predictors explaining 7 % of the
variance in EYES scores. Age (t(118) = .920, p = .359)
was a non-significant predictor of static ToM performance,
whilst IQ (t(118) = 1.94, p = .055) showed a trend towards
significance. Trait alexithymia was entered at the second
step. The regression model was significant (R = .34, R2
adj = .09, F(3,117) = 4.98, p = .003), with the three pre-
dictors collectively explaining 11 % of the variance in
EYES performance. Alexithymia (t(117) = 2.53, p = .013)
was uniquely and negatively associated with EYES per-
formance, whilst Age (t(117) = .224, p = .808) and IQ
(t(117) = 1.43, p = .156), did not reach significance. R
2
change was significant (F(1,117) change = 6.42, p = .013),
indicating that the inclusion of trait alexithymia accounted
for significant additional variance in the model.
ASD traits were entered at the third step. Once again,
the regression model was significant (R = .35, R2
adj = .09, F(4,116) = 4.12, p = .004), with the four pre-
dictors collectively explaining 12 % of the variance in
EYES scores. ASD traits (t(116) = 1.22, p = .227), were
not related to static ToM performance. The R2 change was
not significant in this case (F(1,116) change = 1.48,
p = .227), suggesting that ASD traits did not explain
additional variance in the model. Neither IQ (t(116) = 1.53,
p = .129), nor Age (t(116) = .200, p = .842) reached sta-
tistical significance in this model. However, alexithymia
showed a trend towards significance (t(116) = 1.80,
Table 2 Hierarchical regressions of naturalistic ToM and static ToM
on IQ and age (Step 1), alexithymia (Step 2), and autism traits (Step 3)
Naturalistic ToM task Static ToM task
Beta t p Beta t p
Step 1
IQ .277 2.919 .004** .196 1.939 .055
Age .216 2.283 .024* .093 .920 .359
Step 2
IQ .218 2.335 .021* .144 1.427 .156
Age .140 1.477 .142 .025 .244 .808
TAS -.272 3.061 .003** -.244 2.534 .013*
Step 3
IQ .246 2.746 .007** .155 1.531 .129
Age .129 1.418 .159 .020 .200 .842
TAS -.135 1.443 .152 -.190 1.800 .075
AQ -.302 3.524 .001** -.118 1.216 .227
AQ Autism Spectrum Quotient, TAS Toronto Alexithymia Scale. Full
IQ calculated from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01
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p = .075). Gender was included in the analyses and sub-
sequently removed after returning non-significant results in
all cases.
Overall, findings from our first study demonstrated that
individuals with elevated levels of autism traits experi-
ence a similar pattern of difficulties in empathic pro-
cessing as those with a clinical diagnosis of ASD. As
hypothesized, findings showed that whilst mental state
attribution is significantly impaired in those with higher
levels of ASD traits, the ability to resonate with others’
emotions remains largely intact. Furthermore, findings
from the hierarchical regressions suggested that individ-
uals with higher ASD traits and lower IQ scores experi-
enced greater difficulties in identifying mental states from
dynamic video-based stimuli, but not from static images
depicting the eye region of the face. However, despite
significant associations with autism symptomatology and
ToM ability, trait alexithymia did not explain the men-
talizing difficulties in naturalistic ToM associated with
elevated levels of ASD traits, and was not related to
performance on the affective empathy task. Taken toge-
ther, these findings yield strong support for H1 and H2,
and provide partial support for H5.
Study 2
Method
Participants
One hundred and seven participants (16 % male) from the
original sample returned to complete the second part of the
research. Participants were aged 16–22 (M = 18.12,
SD = 1.24), with IQs between 72 and 129 (M = 101.72,
SD = 11.51). There were no statistically significant dif-
ferences in IQ scores (t(119) = .781, p = .437) between
returning participants and those completing the first part
only (M = 104.29, SD = 12.04).
Assessment of Executive Functioning
Cognitive Flexibility A computerised set-shifting task
(Smillie et al. 2009) based on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST; Grant and Berg 1948), programmed in
Matlab using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions
(Brainard 1997; Pelli 1997), was used to assess cognitive
flexibility. Each trial entailed the presentation of a card,
which varied in three different ways: (1) was blue or yel-
low in colour, (2) displayed either a ‘0’ or an ‘X’ on the
front, and (3) appeared on the left or right side of the
screen. Participants were instructed to sort the cards into
two piles by pressing either the ‘\’ or ‘/’ key (which were
marked as ‘A’ and ‘B’). At the end of each trial, partici-
pants were provided with feedback on the accuracy of their
response.
Participants were told that to learn how to sort the cards
correctly, they would need to use the accuracy feedback
and learn by trial-and-error. After 10 consecutive correct
responses, there was an unannounced switch in the sorting
rule. A total of five shifts took place during the experi-
ment, with each rule repeated twice. The task duration
was approximately 10 min and finished once the partici-
pant had successfully completed all five shifts or once
they had reached the maximum number of trials (120),
whichever was earlier. Performance was assessed via the
total number of shifts made and the shifting efficiency
measure proposed by Cianchetti et al. (2005). This method
of scoring awards six points for each shift that is suc-
cessfully completed and a further point for each remaining
trial, provided that all shifts are made before reaching 120
trials. For instance, a participant who has made all five
shifts in 90 trials would receive a shifting efficiency score
of 5 9 6 ? (120–90) = 60.
Response Inhibition The Go/No-Go (Form S3; Kaiser
et al. 2010) is a widely used measure of response inhibi-
tion. In this task, the participants were required to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible to all individually
presented triangles (‘‘go’’ trials), but to avoid responding to
the circles (‘‘no-go’’ trials). The stimuli were presented for
200 ms and the interstimulus intervals were 1000 ms. The
Go/No-Go comprised two blocks and a total of 250 trials,
19 % of which were ‘‘no-go’’ trials and the remaining 81 %
‘‘go’’ trials. The main outcome variable recorded for this
task was the number of trials in which the participant
responded to a circle (Error of commission).
Planning Ability A computerised version of the Tower of
London (Freiburg Version, ToL-F; Kaller et al. 2012) task
was used to assess planning ability. In this task, a set of
differently coloured balls placed on three vertical rods of
different heights are displayed on the screen. Participants
are presented with a start state and instructed to re-con-
figure the balls to match a given goal state while following
three key rules: (1) Only one ball can be moved at a time,
(2) balls cannot be placed outside the rods, and (3) if more
than one ball is stacked on a rod, only the top ball can be
moved. Participants were also instructed to solve each
problem in the minimum number of moves set for each trial
and to plan a solution before executing the sequence of
movements.
Experimental trials were presented in order of ascending
difficulty and comprised a total of 24 problems (eight four-
move problems, eight five-move problems, and eight six
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move problems). The primary outcome measure for this
task was number of problems correctly solved within a
time limit of 1 min per trial (Planning ability).
Procedure
Participants were administered a series of executive func-
tion tasks in a quiet, dimly lit room. Task order was ran-
domised across each session and participants were
provided with instructions at the start of each test. The
task-set took approximately 1.5 h to complete and partic-
ipants were allowed to take short breaks between the tasks
as needed. Once again, these data were collected as part of
a wider battery of measures.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation
coefficients for all variables are presented in Table 3. With
the exception of WCST Efficiency scores and ToL-F per-
formance (r = .295, p = .002), none of the executive
function measures were interrelated (WCST Efficiency-Go/
No-Go: r = -.057, p = .599; ToL-F-Go/No-Go: r = .112,
p = .251). As predicted, MASC performance was positively
associated with WCST Efficiency (r = .386, p\ .001) and
ToL-F (r = .247, p = .010) scores, and negatively associ-
ated with commission errors on the Go/No-Go (r = -.207,
p = .032). Finally, none of the executive function measures
were significantly associated with SAM performance
(WCST Efficiency: r = .054, p = .578; ToL-F: r = -.034,
p = .730; Go/No-Go: r = -.060, p = .524).
Hierarchical Regressions
We conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses in
order to investigate the association between ToM perfor-
mance, executive functioning, and subclinical ASD traits
whilst controlling for age and general cognitive ability.
Beta estimates for the models are presented in Table 4.
This analysis was intended to further assess the hypothesis
that, in addition to a unique contribution by ASD traits, the
cognitive, but not the affective, domain of empathy would
be associated with executive control abilities (H3).
For the model predicting naturalistic ToM performance,
total MASC scores were first regressed onto Age and IQ
scores. The regression model was significant (R = .45, R2
adj = .19, F(2,104) = 13.25, p\ .001), with the two pre-
dictors collectively explaining 20 % of the variance in
MASC scores. Age (t(104) = 2.79, p = .006) and IQ
(t(104) = 2.20, p = .030) were both positive predictors of
MASC performance. At the second step ASD traits were
entered. The regression model remained significant
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
and correlations between
measures of empathic
processing and executive
control
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. MASC 34.92 4.35 –
2. EYES 79.58 10.19 .284 –
3. SAM .01 1.74 -.090 .123 –
4. WCST 25.02 16.00 .386** .336** .054 –
5. GNG 13.41 6.31 -.207* .016 -.060 -.057 –
6. ToL-F 14.87 3.62 .247* .194* -.034 .295** .112 –
7. Age 18.21 1.24 .407** .001 -.001 .210* -.122 .387**
MASC Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; EYES Reading the Mind from the Eyes Test; SAM
Self-Assessment Manikin Faces task; WCST Wisconsin Card-Sort Test; GNG Go/No-Go; ToL-F Tower of
London- Freiburg Version
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01
Table 4 Hierarchical regressions of naturalistic ToM and Static ToM
on IQ and age (Step 1), autism traits (Step 2), and executive control
(Step 3)
Naturalistic ToM task Static ToM task
Beta t p Beta t p
Step 1
IQ .226 2.197 .030* .148 1.315 .191
Age .288 2.794 .006** .093 .829 .409
Step 2
IQ .249 2.532 .013* .163 1.458 .148
Age .211 2.094 .039* .044 .384 .701
AQ -.296 3.456 .001** -.190 1.951 .054
Step 3
IQ .187 1.866 .065 .058 .503 .616
Age .174 1.732 .086 .024 .213 .831
AQ -.243 2.862 .005** -.180 1.852 .067
WCST .241 2.778 .007** .272 2.749 .007**
Go/No-Go -.127 1.505 .135 .068 .708 .481
ToL-F .042 .447 .656 .070 .660 .511
AQ Autism Spectrum Quotient, TAS Toronto Alexithymia Scale,
WCST Wisconsin Card-Sort Test, GNG Go/No-Go, ToL-F Tower of
London- Freiburg Version. Full IQ calculated from the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01
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(R = .54, R2 adj = .27, F(3,103) = 13.74, p\ .001), with
the three predictors jointly explaining 29 % of the variance
in naturalistic ToM performance. ASD traits (t(103) = 3.46,
p = .001) were uniquely and negatively associated with
MASC performance, whilst Age (t(103) = 2.09, p = .039)
and IQ (t(103) = 2.53, p = .013) revealed unique positive
associations. The R2 change was significant (F(1,103)
change = 11.94, p = .001), indicating that including ASD
traits explained significant additional variance in the
model.
At the third stage, measures of executive function (i.e.,
WCST Efficiency, GNG, and ToL-F) were entered. The
regression model was significant, (R = .60, R2 adj = .32,
F(6,100) = 9.30, p\ .001), and together, the six predictors
explained 36 % of the variance in MASC scores. ASD
traits (t(100) = 2.86, p = .005) and WCST performance
(b = .24, t(100) = 2.78, p = .007), emerged as significant
predictors of naturalistic ToM performance. The signs of
the coefficients suggested that higher ASD traits and lower
levels of cognitive flexibility were related to difficulties in
mental state attribution in a naturalistic context. The R2
change was significant (F(3,100) change = 3.76, p = .013),
suggesting that executive functioning explained signifi-
cantly more variance in the model. None of the other
predictors in the model reached statistical significance, Age
(t(100) = 1.73, p = .086), GNG (t(100) = 1.51, p = .135),
and ToL-F (t(100) = .447, p = .656), although IQ
(t(100) = 1.87, p = .065) indicated a trend towards
significance.
The same regression sequence was applied to static ToM
performance. At the first step, scores on the EYES test
were regressed onto Age and IQ. The regression model was
non-significant, (R = .21, R2 adj = .03, F(2,104) = 2.47,
p = .089), and neither Age (t(104) = .829, p = .409), nor
IQ (t(104) = 1.32, p = .191) reached individual statistical
significance in the model. ASD traits were entered at the
second step. The regression model was significant,
(R = .28, R2 adj = .05 F(3,103) = 2.96, p = .036). Col-
lectively, the three predictors explained 8 % of the vari-
ance in EYES scores. The unique negative association
between ASD traits (t(103) = 1.95, p = .054) and EYES
scores approached significance. The R2 change was sig-
nificant at trend level (F(1, 103) change = 3.81, p = .054),
suggesting that ASD traits explain incremental variance in
the model. Once again, Age (t(103) = .384, p = .701) and
IQ (t(103) = 1.46, p = .148) did not reach statistical
significance.
Measures of executive function (i.e., WCST Efficiency,
GNG, and ToL-F) were entered at the third and final step.
The regression model was significant, (R = .40, R2
adj = .11 F(6,100) = 3.17, p = .007), and together, the six
predictors explained 16 % of the variance in EYES scores.
WCST performance (t(100) = 2.75, p = .007), emerged as
a significant predictor of static ToM. The R2 change was
significant (F(3,100) change = 3.18, p = .027), indicating
that including executive functioning explained significant
additional variance in the model. None of the remaining
predictors reached statistical significance: ASD traits
(t(100) = 1.85, p = .067), GNG (t(100) = .708, p = .481),
ToL-F (t(100) = .660 p = .511), IQ (t(100) = .503,
p = .616), and Age (t(100) = .213, p = .831).
Last, bivariate correlations were computed to assess the
hypothesis that individuals with elevated levels of ASD
traits (H4) and alexithymia (H6) would demonstrate poorer
performance on tasks indexing executive control. Bivariate
correlation coefficients for all variables are presented in
Table 5. There was a significant positive correlation
between ASD traits and commission errors on the GNG
task (r = .250, p = .009). Analysis also revealed a sig-
nificant negative association between ASD symptomatol-
ogy and WCST Shift scores (r = -.224, p = .021).
However, the negative correlations between ASD traits and
WCST Efficiency scores and ToL-F performance were not
statistically significant (p[ .05). A similar pattern
emerged with alexithymia. Whilst there was a significant
positive association with GNG scores (r = .219,
p = .023), the negative relationship with WCST (Effi-
ciency: r = - .135, p = .165; Shift: r = -.134, p = .170)
and ToL-F did not reach statistical significance
(r = -.153, p = .116). Once again, gender was included
in all analyses and subsequently eliminated after returning
non-significant results.
Taken together, findings from Study 2 indicated a sub-
stantial overlap between empathic processing, executive
function, and ASD traits. Analysis revealed that higher
scores on the naturalistic ToM task was associated with
better performance across all components of executive
processing, whilst static ToM was associated with planning
and cognitive flexibility. By contrast, there were no sta-
tistically significant associations between the affective
domain of empathy and executive function.
Our findings also demonstrated age-related improve-
ments in naturalistic ToM as well as in the set-shifting and
planning domains of executive control. However, the
association between age, affective empathy, and commis-
sion errors on the response inhibition task did not reach
statistical significance.
The hierarchical regressions suggested that accurately
decoding mental states from video-based stimuli is asso-
ciated with lower levels of autism symptomatology and
flexible cognition. Of the executive function measures used
in this study, accurate performance on the static EYES test
was exclusively associated with set-shifting ability. In
terms of the autism symptomatology and executive func-
tion relationship, findings showed that individuals with
higher levels of ASD traits exhibit a profile of executive
2080 J Autism Dev Disord (2016) 46:2072–2087
123
function impairments that is partially comparable to those
reported in clinical ASD. Lastly, greater levels of alex-
ithymia were also found to be associated with impaired
response inhibition. However, the negative correlation
between alexithymia and the executive domains of plan-
ning and set-shifting ability did not reach statistical sig-
nificance. Overall, our data yielded strong support for H3,
partial support for H4 and H6, and also indicate the exis-
tence of age-related advancements in mentalizing ability
and executive control.
Discussion
Recent investigations suggest that ToM and executive
function are interrelated constructs following a protracted
course of development, and that autism-related difficulties
in social and executive processing extend beyond individ-
uals diagnosed with ASD. Whilst there is increasing
interest in the link between executive control and mental-
izing, and in their respective relationships with autism,
little relevant research has been conducted at the subclin-
ical level. In the current study, we addressed this gap in the
literature by examining the link between empathic func-
tioning, executive control, and autism symptomatology in a
sample of typically developing adults and adolescents. To
our knowledge, this is the first study to provide a com-
prehensive investigation of these relationships in a non-
clinical population. Our study replicates and extends pre-
vious work by showing that: (1) naturalistic ToM is linked
to elevated levels of autism traits; (2) along with ASD
traits, decoding mental states from dynamic stimuli is
related to flexible cognition; (3) the positive association
between autism traits and executive difficulties observed
here partially parallels studies suggesting executive func-
tion deficits in clinical ASD; and (iv) impaired mentalizing
ability in those with elevated levels of ASD traits is not
explained by co-occurring alexithymia.
As hypothesized (H1 and H5), data from our first study
showed that naturalistic ToM performance was negatively
associated with autism symptomatology and trait alex-
ithymia. By contrast, neither ASD traits nor alexithymia
were related to performance on the affective empathy
task. Whilst our findings in relation to impaired cognitive
and spared affective empathy in ASD traits converge
with existing autism literature (Dziobek et al. 2008;
Jones et al. 2010; Lockwood et al. 2013; Schwenck et al.
2012), the lack of association between alexithymia and
reduced affective empathy is somewhat surprising and
inconsistent with previous reports (Bird et al. 2010;
Lockwood et al. 2013). Nonetheless, the negative asso-
ciation between alexithymia and ToM performance yields
support for previous work reporting alexithymia-related
deficits in the cognitive domain of empathy (Moriguchi
et al. 2006).
Our finding of a modest positive association between
ASD traits and alexithymia replicated data reported in
previous studies (Lockwood et al. 2013). In addition, the
non-significant correlations between measures tapping
cognitive and affective empathy suggest that these tasks
capture distinct components of empathic processing. Fur-
ther analysis revealed unique associations between ASD
traits and impaired mentalizing ability on a naturalistic
measure of ToM. While alexithymia and age did not make
a significant contribution to task performance in this model,
IQ emerged as an independent contributor to mentalizing
ability on the naturalistic ToM task. In contrast, we did not
observe any unique associations between ASD traits and
performance on a static test of ToM (i.e., Reading the Mind
from the Eyes Test; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001a). Taken
together, these results suggest that individuals with higher
levels of ASD traits and lower IQ experience significant
difficulties in attributing mental states to movie characters
in a real-life social context, but not to static images
depicting the eye region of the face. This finding is of
particular importance as it shows that, along with capturing
more profound ToM deficits present in clinical populations
(Dziobek et al. 2006; Lahera et al. 2014), the MASC is also
sensitive in detecting subtle mindreading impairments in
typically developing adults and adolescents.
Table 5 Descriptive statistics
and correlations between
measures of autism spectrum
disorder, alexithymic traits, and
executive control
1 2 3 4 5
1. AQ –
2. TAS .476** –
3. WCST Shift -.224* -.134 –
4. WCST Efficiency -.133 -.135 .829** –
5. GNG .250** .219* -.152 -.057 –
6. ToL -.013 -.153 .231* .295** .112
AQ Autism Spectrum Quotient, TAS Toronto Alexithymia Scale, WCST Wisconsin Card-Sort Test, GNG
Go/No-Go, ToL-F Tower of London- Freiburg Version
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01
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Indeed, the fact that IQ made an independent contribu-
tion to naturalistic ToM performance suggests that along
with autism symptomatology, general cognitive ability also
plays a role in mental-state reasoning in typical develop-
ment. This finding speaks against previous reports docu-
menting non-significant associations between MASC
performance and IQ scores (Dziobek et al. 2006; Lahera
et al. 2014), and, instead, converges with other studies
documenting a positive link between ecologically valid
assessments of ToM and intellectual capacity (Heavey
et al. 2000; Ponnet et al. 2008). However, it is worth noting
that general cognitive ability was no longer significant once
cognitive flexibility was incorporated into the model
(Study 2). This suggests that flexible cognition accounts for
the same variance in ToM as IQ, and is uniquely related to
mentalizing ability. Together, these data indicate the
involvement of multiple processes in successful mental-
ization, and highlight the value of incorporating non-social
cognitive domains in studies of empathic processing.
In sum, Study 1 supported previous research docu-
menting mentalizing deficits in typically developing indi-
viduals with higher levels of autism traits (Go¨kc¸en et al.
2014; Lockwood et al. 2013), and extended their findings
to include a naturalistic measure of ToM. Interestingly, our
results concerning alexithymia appear to be inconsistent
with recent theory and evidence purporting that alex-
ithymic traits account for the observed empathy deficits
related to ASD (Bird and Cook 2013). Rather, our data are
in line with Lockwood et al’s (2013), suggesting that
alexithymia cannot explain the mindreading difficulties
associated with elevated ASD traits.
Findings from our second study revealed significant
associations between ToM performance and executive
control. As expected, scores on a naturalistic measure of
ToM were positively related with set-shifting and planning
ability, and negatively associated with impaired response
inhibition. A similar pattern emerged with static ToM per-
formance, such that scores on this task were positively
related to measures of cognitive flexibility and planning
performance. Nonetheless, the correlation between static
ToM ability and impaired response inhibition did not reach
significance levels. Furthermore, none of the sub-domains
of executive function were related to our measure of
affective empathy. Age was also positively related to nat-
uralistic ToM performance, as well as to the set-shifting and
planning domains of executive function. However, the
negative association between age and response inhibition
failed to reach statistical significance. Interestingly, our
results also indicate that although certain measures of
executive control share some variance, they have the ability
to capture different aspects of higher order processing.
Additional analyses revealed unique associations between
ToM performance and executive control. For instance, along
with ASD traits, cognitive flexibility also emerged as a sig-
nificant predictor of naturalistic ToM. With regards to static
ToM performance, findings showed that cognitive flexibility
was the only predictor to reach statistical significance. Col-
lectively, these findings suggest that autism symptomatology
and flexible cognition are key factors associated with optimal
performance on a naturalistic measure of cognitive empathy.
However, of the social and executive function variables
included in the present study, decoding mental states from
static images appears to call solely upon the executive domain
of cognitive flexibility.
The influential role of autism symptomatology and
executive processing is perhaps not surprising given that
the MASC provides a closer approximation of the intri-
cacies involved in everyday social interactions. For
example, by presenting dynamic interactions in a real-
world context, this task empirically evaluates participants’
capacity to recognise characters’ thoughts, emotions, and
intentions from multiple channels of communication.
Since this measure provides a more complex and eco-
logically valid assessment of mentalizing ability, suc-
cessful performance on this task is likely to be sub-served
by key neurocognitive processes enabling flexible adap-
tation to changing social contexts, and the capacity to
shift between our own and others’ perspectives during
mental state reasoning. In contrast to video-based
assessments of ToM, mental-state attribution to static
images is likely to make less of a demand upon available
processing resources.
It is worth noting that our data are inconsistent with
previous work reporting non-significant associations
between naturalistic ToM performance and executive
control. One explanation for this apparent discrepancy may
lie in the type of executive function tasks employed. For
instance, Lahera et al. (2014) assessed the naturalistic ToM
and executive control relationship using only a brief mea-
sure of neuro-cognition (i.e., Screen for Cognitive
Impairment in Psychiatry; Purdon 2005; SCIP), rather than
a comprehensive battery of tasks. In addition, Dziobek
et al. (2006) administered a different set of experimental
paradigms to assess executive functions (i.e., Stroop Test,
Stroop 1935; Trail Making Test, Reitan and Wolfson 1993;
and verbal fluency, Horn 1962), rendering a direct com-
parison with the present study considerably difficult.
Therefore, replication of our methodologies and findings in
ASD populations will help resolve the inconsistencies
surrounding the association between naturalistic ToM and
executive control.
Interestingly, the positive association between age and
executive function, in combination with the finding that
younger participants make more ToM errors, appears to be
in line with the notion that social cognition and executive
function follow a protracted developmental course (Decety
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2010; Dumontheil et al. 2010). We also found that autism
symptomatology was associated with increased executive
problems. For instance, analysis showed that individuals
with higher ASD traits evidenced poorer response inhibi-
tion and achieved fewer set-shifts on a measure of cogni-
tive flexibility. However, it should be noted that the
negative association between autism traits and shifting
efficiency—a more sensitive index of flexible cognition—
failed to reach statistical significance. In addition, no sig-
nificant association was found between planning ability
and ASD traits. With respect to alexithymia, impairments
were only observed on the response inhibition domain of
executive processing.
The observed relationships between autism symptoma-
tology, cognitive flexibility, and impaired response inhi-
bition are in line with previous reports from ASD
populations (Pellicano 2007; Robinson et al. 2009; though
see Hill 2004a, b), but partly contradict data from Christ
et al’s (2010) study examining executive functioning in
subclinical ASD traits. Again, the conflicting pattern of
results should be viewed in light of the assessment tech-
niques employed. For example, whilst Christ et al. (2010)
used a self-report measure of higher-order processing, the
present study administered a behavioral index of all rele-
vant executive domains. Therefore, it is possible that the
behavioral methodology employed by the current study is
better able to detect individual differences in response
inhibition. Together, these findings demonstrate that
response inhibition and cognitive flexibility are adversely
affected in those with higher levels of ASD traits, and
suggest that the executive processing difficulties charac-
terising ASDs extend beyond people with a clinical diag-
nosis, into the general population. However, given that
people with clinical ASD typically exhibit deficits planning
and cognitive flexibility, whilst response inhibition remains
largely intact (Hill 2004a, b), these data yield only partial
support for the hypothesis that individuals with high levels
of subclinical autism traits have a similar profile of exec-
utive deficits as their peers with clinical ASD.
In addition to informing our understanding of the
broader autism phenotype, these results also have impli-
cations for clinical practice. Importantly, they indicate that
cognitive empathy and executive function are key pro-
cesses to consider when designing intervention pro-
grammes targeting adaptive social functioning in typically
developing populations with elevated levels of autism
traits. With regards to clinical ASD, the finding that natu-
ralistic ToM was related to deficits in cognitive flexibility
suggests that this executive domain may be particularly
relevant for enhancing the treatment effects of social
interventions. In other words, a multi-tier approach to
social interventions may be necessary to improve socio-
adaptive outcomes and alleviate the direct and indirect
negative consequences associated with interpersonal diffi-
culties in ASD. A further implication of these findings
concerns the selection of control participants in autism
research. Controlling for ASD traits in typically devel-
oping populations may be particularly important when
examining ToM and executive function abilities, as
variability in these traits may influence task performance
and hinder the accurate profiling of social and non-social
processes in clinical ASD. The presence of significant
group differences in social and executive processing
abilities might, therefore, depend on whether control
participants are nearer the higher or lower end of the
broader autism spectrum range (von dem Hagen et al.
2011). Thus, establishing levels of subclinical autism
symptomatology could provide a more accurate profile of
the neurocognitive processes underpinning social dys-
function in ASD.
Limitations
Most participants in this study were female, leading to a
significant gender imbalance in our sample. This is a
consequence of primarily recruiting Psychology students
(undergraduate and A-level), where there is an evident
female bias. Although analysis revealed no confounding by
gender, the association between executive control and
mentalizing difficulties may vary across males and females
with elevated autism traits. For instance, recent investiga-
tions have reported gender-specific cognitive impairments
in ASD, with high-functioning autistic males evidencing
greater deficits in sub-domains of executive control relative
to their female counterparts (Bo¨lte et al. 2011; Lehnhardt
et al. 2016). Thus, given that executive function impair-
ments in ASD are partially modulated by sex, and that
better executive control potentiates socio-communicative
skills (Bo¨lte et al. 2011), examining these processes in
more balanced, or male-dominated samples could reveal a
stronger association between executive control and ToM
deficits. To address this gap in the literature, future
investigations should compare male and female partici-
pants in order to help determine whether sex-related dif-
ferences in neurocognitive processing extend to subclinical
ASD. A further aim would be to ascertain the extent to
which these differences influence the link between
impaired ToM and executive dysfunction. As it stands, the
pattern of results observed in the current study may be
female-specific and limited in its generalizability to male
samples. Second, the study does not address the issue of
directionality between ToM and executive control deficits.
The extent to which impairments in mentalizing abil-
ity may be accounted for by executive dysfunction is,
therefore, unclear and warrants further investigation. Third,
whilst naturalistic assessments provide a closer
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approximation of empathic processing, in real-life social
situations, mental-state reasoning and empathic responses
occur in the context of reciprocal social interactions.
Consequently, it would be of particular interest to observe
participants’ interpersonal competence in an experimental
setting. Such a line of investigation would also help
determine whether the processing deficits associated with
elevated autism symptomatology can explain real-world
social functioning. Finally, future investigations should
also utilise dual-task paradigms to assess social and non-
social information processing simultaneously. Whilst our
data corroborate the notion that executive function and
ToM are closely bound constructs, examining them in
tandem could be instrumental to our understanding of
successful social performance in everyday contexts and,
ultimately, to the design of interventions programmes tar-
geting interpersonal performance. More immediately, the
potential importance for clinicians is highlighted of
assessing both cognitive empathy and executive function in
individualising programmes in order to support the social
functioning of adolescents and young adults, even when
there is no ASD diagnosis.
Conclusions
In summary, the current research findings suggest that ASD
traits, executive function, age, and general cognitive ability
are important factors in optimal mentalizing ability.
Moreover, they show that individuals with elevated levels
of autism traits display a similar profile of difficulties in
empathic functioning, and a partially comparable pattern of
executive function deficits as those with a clinical diag-
nosis of ASD. Further investigation of these domains in
both clinical and subclinical ASD has the potential to
advance our understanding of the broader autism pheno-
type as well as to elucidate the neurocognitive underpin-
nings of adaptive social behavior.
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